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THE IMPACT OF NON-MUTUAL COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL ON TORT LITIGATION INVOLVING
SEVERAL LIABILITY
M. E. OCCHIALINO*

I. INTRODUCTION
The twin doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel seek to prevent
unnecessary multiple litigation. Res judicata bars a second suit between the same
parties or their privies when the same cause of action either was or could have
been litigated in an earlier lawsuit which culminated in a final judgment on the
merits.' The New Mexico Supreme Court sometimes refers to this doctrine as
"claim preclusion" because, when it applies, it bars the second claim from
proceeding at all. 2 Collateral estoppel does not bar a second lawsuit; it merely
precludes relitigation of certain issues in the second suit, if those issues were
once litigated and necessarily determined in an earlier lawsuit.' The supreme
court uses the phrases "collateral estoppel" and "issue preclusion" interchangeably when referring to this doctrine. 4
The New Mexico Supreme Court has reconsidered both doctrines recently.
The court has expanded the applicability of both case preclusion and issue
preclusion by redefining one requirement of each doctrine. 5
In Silva v. State,6 the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of
non-mutual collateral estoppel. Prior to Silva, issues decided in one lawsuit were
binding in a subsequent lawsuit only if the parties in the first and second lawsuits
were the same or in privity.7 Silva abandoned the "same party or privity" requirement. New Mexico now requires only that: 1) the party against whom
*Keleher & McLeod Professor of Law, University of New Mexico Law School. B.A. Siena College,
1964; J.D. Georgetown University Law Center 1967.
I. " [W]here the causes of action in the cases are identical in all respects, the first judgment is a conclusive
bar upon the parties
and their privies as to every issue which either was or properly could have been litigated
in the previous case." City of Santa Fe v. Velarde, 90 N.M. 444, 446, 564 P.2d 1326, 1328 (1977).
2. Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 474, 745 P.2d 380, 382 (1987).
3. "Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of ultimate facts or issues actually and necessarily decided in a
prior suit. . . . iTihe cause of action in the second suit need not be identical with the first suit. . . .To
give rise to estoppel, the findings of ultimate facts in the prior action must have been final." Silva, 106
N.M. at 474, 745 P.2d at 382 (citations omitted).
4. Id.
5. In Three Rivers Land Co., Inc. v. Maddoux, 98 N.M. 690, 652 P.2d 240 (1982), overruled in part
on other grounds in Universal Life Church v. Coxon, 105 N.M. 57, 728 P.2d 467 (1986), the court adopted
the expansive "same transaction" test, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, §24 (1980), for
determining whether the claims in the first and second suit are the same. Under this test, "the claim
extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any
partof the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose." Id.; 98 N.M.
at 695, 652 P.2d at 245. The adoption of the "same transaction" test increases the number of situations in
which the res judicata doctrine will bar second lawsuits from proceeding.
6. 106 N.M. 472, 745 P.2d 380 (1987).
7. E.g., Edwards v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Clovis, 102 N.M. 396, 696 P.2d 484 (Ct. App.
1985).
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preclusion is sought in the subsequent action was a party or in privity with a
party to the first action, and 2) that party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issues in the intitial action.8 This newly-formulated "against whom" rule is
available both to preclude a plaintiff from relitigating an issue he previously
litigated and lost (defensive collateral estoppel), 9 and to prevent a defendant
from relitigating an issue the defendant had previously litigated and lost (offensive
collateral estoppel). "
The effect of Silva is to increase greatly the occasions when case preclusion
or issue preclusion will apply to bar subsequent litigation or the retrial of issues
tried in earlier litigation. Attorneys must take account of these changes when
deciding whether to engage in multiple lawsuits or whether to use existing
procedural devices to bring all aspects of a legal dispute in a single case. Plaintiffs
must incorporate the new preclusion rules into their analysis of whether to join
multiple defendants and claims in a single suit. Defendants must do the same
in deciding whether to implead third parties, whether to file cross-claims, and
whether to file counterclaims. Persons who are not named as parties to the initial
action involving a common transaction must decide whether to intervene in the
first action or to await the result of the initial suit and then file a separate suit.
This article asseses the impact of the new issue preclusion doctrine in multitortfeasor personal injury litigation to which the doctrine of several liability
applies. Since 1982," strategy in tort litigation has been affected by the fact that
plaintiffs usually can no longer recover their full damages from a single tortfeasor
when multiple wrongdoers cause harm. Instead, each tortfeasor is responsible
only for the percentage of total damages which is attributed to that tortfeasor's
negligence. "2This article focuses on the extent to which the percentages of fault
attributed to wrongdoers in one case may be binding in subsequent litigation
involving the same incident and some of the same persons who were parties in
the earlier case. Also considered is the issue of whether the factfinder's determination of the amount of damages suffered by a party is binding upon parties
in succeeding lawsuits involving the same injuries.
II. REVIEW OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW
In 1981, the New Mexico Supreme Court abolished the common law defense
of contributory negligence.' 3 The court substituted the doctrine of pure com8. Silva, 106 N.M. at 476, 745 P.2d at 384.
9. "IThe doctrine of defensive collateral estoppel may be applied when a defendant seeks to preclude
a plaintiff from relitigating an issue the plaintiff has previously litigated and lost regardless of whether
defendant was privy to the prior suit." Silva, 106 N.M. at 476, 745 P.2d at 384.
10. "IThe doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel may be applied when a plaintiff seeks to foreclose
the defendant from litigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully regardless of
whether plaintiff was privy to the prior action." Id. Though offensive collateral estoppel is authorized in
New Mexico, close scrutiny of the fairness of the application in particular cases is called for in order to
prevent abuse. Id.; see Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979).
I1.See Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982).
12. Id. A statute now incorporates, with some modifications, the doctrine of several liability created by
the court in Bartlett. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I (Cum. Supp. 1988).
13. Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981).
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parative negligence under which the plaintiff's causal negligence, if any, does
not bar recovery but reduces the damages otherwise recoverable against the
defendant by the percentage of fault assigned to the plaintiff's negligence.' 4
The adoption of comparative negligence as between plaintiff and defendant
did not immediately affect the separate common law rule of joint and several
liability of tortfeasors. That doctrine provides that where the concurrent negligence of numerous tortfeasors combines to cause a single indivisible injury, each
defendant is fully (jointly and severally) liable for the entire injury.' 5 Plaintiff,
however, can recover the total of his damages only once from any tortfeasor or
combination of tortfeasors who are jointly and severally liable. If one joint
tortfeasor pays more than his pro rata share of the total judgment, that tortfeasor
can seek contribution from other joint tortfeasors. 6
In 1982, the court of appeals abolished joint and several liability for concurrent
tortfeasors. In its place, the court imposed several liability on tortfeasors by
extending the application of comparative fault apportionment from plaintiff/
defendant comparisons to comparisons of the tortious conduct of all personsplaintiffs, defendants and even non-party wrongdoers. 7 Today, with few exceptions, 8 a defendant can avoid full liability for plaintiff's compensable damages
by establishing that another person acted tortiously and was also a cause of the
plaintiff's harm. '" Proof that another person's negligent conduct contributed to
the plaintiff's injury reduces the defendant's liability by the percentage of fault
attributable to the other tortfeasor.20 This rule applies whether the other tortfeasor
is a plaintiff, a co-defendant, or is a non-party to the plaintiff's action."
III. THE PLAINTIFF'S PERSPECTIVE
The plaintiff injured by multiple wrongdoers who are severally liable can fully
recover only if the plaintiff obtains a judgment against each tortfeasor for the
portion of damages attributable to the fault of each tortfeasor.22 The plaintiff
must decide whether to sue the multiple tortfeasors in separate lawsuits or whether
to join them in a single action.
Prior to Silva, the plaintiff did not have to worry about issue preclusion in
making this decision. If plaintiff (P) sued only tortfeasor A in the initial suit,
neither the factfinder's determination of the amount of damages nor its assessment
14. Id. at 690, 634 P.2d at 1242.
15. "lUlsing the term 'joint and several liability,' we mean that either of two persons whose concurrent
negligence contributed to cause plaintiff's injury and damage may be held liable for the entire amount of
the damage caused by them." Bartlett, 98 N.M. at 154, 646 P.2d at 581 (citations omitted).
16. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3-1 to -8 (Recomp. 1986).
17. Bartlett, 98 N.M. at 159, 646 P.2d at 586. In Bartlett, the court held that the defendant could insist
on a comparison of the defendant's fault not only with that of other parties, but also with that of a nonparty, even one whose name was not known. Id.
18. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I(C) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
19. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-1 (Cum. Supp. 1988). The burden is on the defendant to establish that
another tortfeasor's negligence contributed to the accident. Id.

20. Id.
21. In Bartlett, the jury assigned a percentage of fault to a non-party to the action. 98 N.M. at 153,
646 P.2d at 580.
22. It is not necessary, however, to obtain a judgment against a settling tortfeasor. See N.M. STAT.
ANN. §41-3A-I(E) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
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of the percentages of fault of plaintiff, of tortfeasor A, or of the absent tortfeasor
B, would be binding on any party in subsequent litigation plaintiff brought against
B. This was so because the parties in the second suit, P and B, were not both
parties or in privity with parties in the first suit. Absent complete mutuality of
parties, no issue preclusion was available. 23
After Silva, the findings on damages and percentages of fault in P's action
against A can be binding against P in his subsequent action against B. Though
the parties are not all the same,.B would be asserting issue preclusion against
P who was a party in the first action. The "against whom" requirement of Silva
is met even though the former requirement of mutuality of parties is not met.
B, therefore, could estop P from relitigating the amount of damages or the
percentages of fault of P, A, or B, so long as B could demonstrate that P had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate and that those issues were actually and
necessarily determined in the initial lawsuit.
In contrast, P will never be able to bind B in the second suit to the facts as
determined in the first action because B, the party against whom P would seek
to use collateral estoppel, was neither a party to the first action nor in privity
with a party. The "against whom" requirement of Silva is not satisfied.
To illustrate:
#1 P v. A
Jury finds:
Damages-$ 10,000
P's %--60%
A's %---30% B's %o--10%
#2 P v. B
Issue preclusion available to P:
None
Issue preclusion available to B:
P's fault is 60%
B's fault is 10%
A's fault is 30%
P's damages cannot exceed $10,000
This example demonstrates that P never will be able to use favorable findings
from the first action to bind B in the second suit. Clearly, P cannot benefit from
the new rules of issue preclusion by filing serial lawsuits against multiple wrongdoers.
In contrast, B can benefit from the ruling in Silva because B can assert issue
preclusion as to the findings in the first action against P, a party to that suit, so
long as P had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues and the issues were
necessarily decided in the first suit. If the findings in the first suit were favorable
to B, B can preclude P from litigating anew. If, in contrast, the findings were
not favorable to B, B could forego asserting collateral estoppel because collateral
estoppel is an affirmative defense which B can waive by failing to raise the issue
in the answer.24 If B decides not to assert collateral estoppel, there will be a full
trial on the merits of each issue in the second lawsuit.
23. See, e.g., Edwards v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Clovis, 102 N.M. 396, 696 P.2d 484 (Ct.
App. 1985).
24. SCRA 1986, R. 1-008(C).
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Merely because B's use of issue preclusion against P would meet the "against
whom" test, however, does not assure that issue preclusion will apply. In Silva,
the court added a second requirement for the application of non-mutual collateral
estoppel: Even when the "against whom" requirement is satisfied, issue preclusion is inapplicable if the person against whom it is sought to be used did not
have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the first case.25 In deciding
whether there has been a full and fair opportunity to litigate, the court must
consider the "equities, including, but not limited to, prior incentive for vigorous
defense, inconsistencies, procedural opportunities and inconvenience of forum
as discussed in Parklane Hosiery Co."26

The issue of whether a party to the first action had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate is especially significant in several liability cases in which the first trial
apportioned fault to a tortfeasor who was not a party to the first action. In such
cases, the limited discovery available against the non-party in the first action, 27
the possibility that the non-party was beyond the subpoena power of the court,
and the lack of a clash of adversaries that can occur when the defendant "lays
off" fault on a non-party who has no stake in disputing the issue,28 are factors
to consider in determining whether the party to the first lawsuit had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate in the initial action. 29
25. "Fundamental fairness requires that the party against whom estoppel is asserted had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate." Silva, 106 N.M. at 474, 745 P.2d at 382.
The party seeking to apply collateral estoppel bears the burden of establishing that the requirements for
its application are met. Id. at 476, 745 P.2d at 384; International Paper Co. v. Farrar, 102 N.M. 739, 742,
700 P.2d 642, 645 (1985).
26. Silva, 106 N.M. at 476, 745 P.2d at 384. InParklane Hosiery Co., Inc.. the Supreme Court identified
the following factors as relevant to the determination of whether the application of non-mutual collateral
estoppel, particularly offensive collateral estoppel, is equitable: 1)Absence of incentive to litigate vigorously
in the first suit, "particularly if future suits are not foreseeable;" 2) "'[The judgment relied upon as a basis
for the estoppel is itself inconsistent with one or more previous judgments in favor" of the party against
whom issue preclusion is sought; 3) "[Wihere the second action affords the [party] procedural opportunities
unavailable in the first action that could readily cause a different result .... If, for example, the defendant
in the first action was forced to defend in an inconvenient forum and therefore was unable to engage in
Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330-31
full scale discovery or call witnesses.
and n.15 (1979).
To this list the New Mexico Supreme Court added the issue of whether the factfinder in the first action
was a judge or jury or whether the first action involved "the use of a special master or other alternative
or administrative dispute resolution techniques." Silva, 106 N.M. at 476, 745 P.2d at 384.
27. The only procedural device available against a non-party is the deposition, see SCRA 1986, R. I030(A), though documents in the possession of a non-party may be viewed or copied by the use of a
subpoena duces tecum in conjunction with the deposition. See SCRA 1986, R. 1-045(D)(1).
In Wilson v. Gillis, 105 N.M. 259, 262, 731 P.2d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 105 N.M.
230, 731 P.2d 373 (1987), the court of appeals, in a different context, downplayed the impact of diminished
discovery possibilities against a non-party.
28. In a case, such as Bartlett, where the defendant diminishes its own liability by "laying off" fault
on a non-party, the non-party is not present to rebut the testimony. Even if the plaintiff calls the non-party
as a witness, the non-party has no stake in the outcome and, thus, no special incentive to testify in a way
that will diminish the percentage of liability attributed to thenon-party witness.
29. In the illustration presented in the text in which the non-party to the first action uses collateral
estoppel against the plaintiff in the first suit, the plaintiff may not be in a good position to argue that he
lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate because of these factors. If the plaintiff could have joined the
non-party as a defendant in the first action and chose not to do so, any difficulties created by the absence
of the non-party in the first action might be attributed to plaintiff's tactical decision rather than to any
inherent flaw in the first case. A plaintiff in the initial action who intentionally foregoes the opportunity to
join other defendants perhaps normally should not succeed in the claim that he lacked a "full and fair
opportunity to litigate" if his claim is based on the absence of the current defendant from the first action.
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In determining the fairness of the application of non-mutual collateral estoppel,
the New Mexico courts will have to resolve several specific questions not encompassed within the factors the court enumerated in Silva. For example, New
Mexico must decide the point during the second litigation when a party who can
use collateral estoppel must request that the court apply the doctrine. Can a party
fully litigate the issues de novo in the second suit and, depending upon whether
the results of the second trial are more or less favorable than the findings in the
first trial, decide whether to assert collateral estoppel or to accept the findings
in the second trial? The court should not permit a party to litigate the issues in
the second trial before deciding whether to take advantage of issue preclusion.
Collateral estoppel fosters efficient use of judicial resources, relieves parties
of the burdens of multiple litigation and precludes the possibility of inconsistent
results which can occur when the same issues are litigated in successive suits. 3"
None of these purposes is fulfilled if B can relitigate an issue in the second trial
before deciding whether to assert collateral estoppel. The treatment of collateral
estoppel in the rules of procedure buttresses this conclusion. Collateral estoppel
is an affirmative defense. 3' Defendant must raise collateral estoppel in the answer,
well prior to the second trial, or waive the benefits of the doctrine.32 When a
defendant does raise issue preclusion as an affirmative defense, the court should
determine whether the doctrine is applicable prior to the trial33 and should enter
a pretrial order setting forth the issues precluded from trial.34
New Mexico also must decide whether a party can choose to assert collateral
estoppel as to certain issues, while waiving issue preclusion as to other issues
decided less favorably to that party in the first action. In the illustration above,
if B is pleased with the finding in the first action that B is only 10% at fault,
but believes that the prior finding of damages in the amount of $10,000 is too
high, may B assert collateral estoppel as to B's percentage of fault but insist on
litigating the amount of damages? There is no New Mexico precedent resolving
this issue. There is precedent, however, that would permit a court to bar a party
from using collateral estoppel selectively where no reason other than partisan
advantage justifies the party's decision to invoke preclusion selectively. The trial
judge need not apply collateral estoppel merely because each of the required
elements is present and a party requests that the court do so: "When all the
elements of collateral estoppel are met, the doctrine may not be applied by a
judge when the purposes for which it would be used would be fundamentally
30. "The underlying principle behind resjudicata is to relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple
lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on
adjudication." Three Rivers Land Co., Inc. v. Maddoux, 98 N.M. 690, 694, 652 P.2d 240, 244 (1982),
overruled in part on other grounds in Universal Life Church v. Coxon, 105 N.M. 57, 728 P.2d 467
(1986)(quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)). The policies supporting collateral estoppel are
similar. See Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc.v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
31. SCRA 1986, R. 1-008(C). The rules of procedure provide no method for offensive use of collateral
estoppel by a plaintiff. InSilva, the plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to the issues
which plaintiff alleged were subject to collateral estoppel. Silva, 106 N.M. at 473, 745 P.2d at 381.
32. Fredenburgh v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 79 N.M. 593, 446 P.2d 868 (1968).
33. Defendant can bring the issue to the attention of the trial court by moving for a judgment on the
pleadings, SCRA 1986, R. 1-012(C), or a partial summary judgment, SCRA 1986, R. 1-056. Plaintiff can
move to strike the defense as inadequate, SCRA 1986, R. 1-012(F), or can seek a partial summary judgment,
SCRA 1986, R. 1-056; see Silva, 106 N.M. at 473, 745 P.2d at 381. The trial judge can raise and resolve
the issue at the pretrial conference. See SCRA 1986, R. 1-016.
34. See SCRA 1986, R. 1-016.

Winter 1988]

IMPACT OF NON-MUTUAL COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

565

unfair and would not further the aims of the doctrine." 35 Only if a party seeking
to apply collateral estoppel selectively can demonstrate that there is a legitimate
reason to distinguish among issues,36 should the court permit the party to pick
and choose fewer than all the relevant, available, issues for collateral estoppel
treatment.
As to some issues involving several liability, there is an additional reason to
forbid the selective use of collateral estoppel. The doctrine of several liability
requires that the percentages of fault of all wrongdoers equal 100%. 3 One purpose
of collateral estoppel is to assure consistency in multiple judgments concerning
the same dispute. 3' The court normally should not allow a party selectively to
assert issue preclusion as to the percentages of fault determined in the initial
lawsuit. If selective issue preclusion were available, the percentages of liability
might not total 100%. In the illustration above, a court should not allow B to
assert issue preclusion as to the finding that P's fault was 60%, while demanding
relitigation of the correctness of the prior factfinder's determination that B was
10% at fault. Such selective issue preclusion as to fault percentages almost
inevitably would lead to undesirable contradictory findings in the first and second
lawsuit. Absent compelling justification, a court should not tolerate selective
issue preclusion as to fault percentages. The trial judge normally should require
that the party asserting collateral estoppel accept all the findings allocating fault,
or litigate the percentages of fault anew.
A related issue arises when a party to the second suit wishes to introduce the
fault of a tortfeasor whose negligence was not in issue in the first action. For
example, assume that the first suit allocated fault only among the plaintiff, the
defendant and non-party A because neither plaintiff nor defendant raised the issue
of the fault of any other person: Should collateral estoppel apply to fault percentages established in the first trial when the plaintiff in the first trial files a
second action against A and A seeks to prove the partial fault of B whose fault
was not raised or litigated in the first suit? As a matter of logic, collateral estoppel
should not apply to the allocation of fault set in the first action because the likely
effect of permitting issue preclusion while also permitting the factfinder to assess
fault to a new person would be a verdict in the second lawsuit that allocated
more than 100% of the fault.39

A case can be made, however, for applying issue preclusion at least in some
of these situations. If collateral estoppel could never be applied when a party in
35. Adams v. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, 97 N.M. 369, 373, 640 P.2d 475, 479 (1982).
36. There may be a reason why one issue was not fully litigated in an earlier action while other issues
were carefully presented and exhaustively tried. For example, a plaintiff might sue the first action against
a tavern owner for liability under the New Mexico Dram Shop Act. Because liability, until recently, see
Richardson v. Carnegie Library Restaurant, Inc., -. N.M. ,763 P.2d 1153 (1988), was limited
by statute to $50,000 in such cases, see N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-11-1 (1)(Repl. Pamp. 1986), the
plaintiff may not have tried to maximize damages beyond the statutory limit, but may have had the
incentive and the ability to litigate fully issues relevant to the allocation of liability.
37. "The total of the percentages must equal 100% for the persons whose negligence did proximately
cause the damage." N.M. UJI Civ. 13-2219 (Recomp. 1986).
38. Three Rivers Land Co., Inc. v. Maddoux, 98 N.M. 690, 694, 652 P.2d 240, 244 (1982), overruled
in part on other grounds in Universal Life Church v. Coxon, 105 N.M. 57, 728 P.2d 467 (1986).
39. For example, the first factfinder may have assessed fault at 20% for P, 10% for D and 70% for A.
In a later action by P against A, in which A asserts that B is 90% at fault, the jury might agree that B is
90% at fault while the court also applies issue preclusion to the earlier determination that P is 20% at fault.
The result could be that well over 100% of fault would be assigned for the same accident and injury.
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the second lawsuit raised the fault of a new tortfeasor in the second action, any
party against whom collateral estoppel was sought to be applied in the second
suit could negate the application of the doctrine simply by alleging that the
factfinder in the second action should consider the fault of a tortfeasor not
mentioned in the first action. To prevent this, the court might bar the introduction
of the issue of a new tortfeasor's contribution to the accident when raised for
the first time by a party who could have raised the issue while a party in the
earlier action, but did not do so.' No firm rule can be established to control
such situations. In general, however, it would appear inappropriate to deny issue
preclusion merely because the party seeking to avoid application of the doctrine
wants to raise the fault of a new person if that party could and should have
raised that issue in the first lawsuit, but failed to do so for no justifiable reason.4
The abolition of joint and several liability creates an incentive for the plaintiff
to sue all tortfeasors rather than merely the one with the deepest pocket. Prior
to Silva, the plaintiff could have chosen to sue tortfeasors serially in separate
actions without fear that collateral estoppel might result in adverse consequences
for the plaintiff in subsequent actions. After Silva, tortfeasors sued separately
later can use issue preclusion against plaintiff, but plaintiff cannot use the doctrine
40. The conceptual underpinning for barring the party from raising the new tortfeasor's fault may lie
in the definition of the issue that was litigated in the first action. Issue preclusion applies only to issues
actually litigated and necessarily decided in the prior action. City of Santa Fe v. Velarde, 90 N.M. 444,
446, 564 P.2d 1326, 1328 (1977). One could define the issue as the comparative fault of the tortfeasor
first mentioned in the later lawsuit. Not having been raised in the first case, that issue could not have been
necessarily decided there. See, e.g., O'Conner v. State, 70 N.Y.2d 914, 519 N.E.2d 302, 524 N.Y.S.2d
391 (1987) (no collateral estoppel where "there has been no showing .. . that the [first] count addressed
relative culpability as between" the parties to the second suit); Pocatello Indus. Park Co. v. Steel West,
Inc.,
101 Idaho 783, 621 P.2d 399 (1980).
By defining theissue tried in the first action more broadly, however, the result could be different. The
issue tried in the first action could be stated as the percentages of fault attributable to all persons who were
involved in the accident. That issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in the first action
even though the resolution of the issue did not involve consideration of the fault of the alleged tortfeasor
whose misconduct was not raised until the second lawsuit. New Mexico appears to follow this approach.
The applicable jury instruction instructs the jury to "Iclompare the negligence, if any, of Iplaintiff(s)l . . .
land] [defendant(s)] (and] [non-parties] and determine a percentage for each. . . .The total of the percentages must equal 100% for the persons whose negligence did proximately cause the damage." N.M.
UJI Civ. 13-2219 (Recomp. 1986).
The Restatement concedes that "lolne of the most difficult problems in the application of the rule [of
issue preclusion] is to delineate the issue on which litigation is, or is not, foreclosed by the prior judgment."
guideRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, §27, comment c (1982). The Restatement provides useful
lines for resolution of the problem. Id.
41. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(3) (1980)(One circumstance to consider in deciding
person seeking to invoke favorable
whether to permit non-mutual collateral estoppel is whether "[tlhe
preclusion, or to avoid unfavorable preclusion, could have effected joinder in the first action between
himself and his present adversary."). By a parity of reasoning, the extent to which a person could have
raised the question of the fault of the newly named tortfeasor in the earlier action should be considered
when defining the issue that was actually tried and necessarily determined in the earlier action. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §27 comment c (1982).
O'Conner v. State, 70 N.Y.2d 914, 519 N.E.2d 302, 524 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1987), illustrates the type of
legitimate justification that might exist for failing to raise the issue earlier. There, plaintiff was forced, by
jurisdictional requirements, to sue the two tortfeasors in separate courts. The first court considered only
the fault of P and D, the defendant in that action, because the judge was aware that the fault of D2, the
other tortfeasor, was an issue presented in the second action then pending. The New York Court of Appeals
held that the findings in the first action allocating fault between P and D2 were not binding in the second
action between P and D2. Id. at 915, 519 N.E.2d at 303, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
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against the defendant. This creates a powerful incentive in plaintiff to sue all
tortfeasors in a single lawsuit. The combination of several liability and nonmutual collateral estoppel, therefore, should move plaintiff to join all tortfeasors
in a single action rather than to sue only the wealthiest of them or to sue each
of them in separate actions.
IV. THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE
A. The Defendant Who Is Sued with a Co-Defendant
Accidents often injure many persons, each of whom may have been partially
at fault. The adoption of pure comparative negligence42 opens the door for
possible recovery of some damages by each tortfeasor who is injured in an
accident in which others also are injured. All participants in such accidents are
possible plaintiffs and the status of plaintiff merely attaches to the first person
who files a lawsuit.43 The person who sues first is likely to join all tortfeasors
in a single lawsuit" Defendants who have been joined must decide whether to
file cross-claims against one another for their own injuries, or whether to defer
such suits until the plaintiff's action is completed.45
Cross-claims are permissive, not compulsory.' Current law thus does not
compel a defendant to file a cross-claim for fear that res judicata principles will
bar a subsequent lawsuit for affirmative relief against the former co-defendant.47
Though res judicata does not bar co-defendants from suing each other for
affirmative relief in a subsequent action, defendants contemplating a separate
lawsuit must consider the related issue of whether collateral estoppel will apply
in the later action. To date, New Mexico has followed the rule that "the rights
42. Scottv.Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981).
43. See Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc.,
98 N.M. 152, 158, 646 P.2d 579, 585 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648P.2d 794 (1982).
44. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
45. Apart from deciding whether to seek affirmative relief, each defendant also will raise the fault of
other defendants as a partial defense to plaintiff's claim against the defendant. See Bartlett v. New Mexico
Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794
(1982). This can be done by asserting the negligence of co-defendants as an affirmative defense to the
plaintiff's claim. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I(B) (Cum. Supp. 1988) (fault of others must be proven
by defendant); SCRA 1986, R. 1-008(C) (pleading affirmative defenses). It is unclear whether this defense
also can be asserted in a cross-claim against a co-defendant. See Tipton v. Texaco, Inc., 103 N.M. 689,
712 P.2d 1351 (1985)(Bartlet defense of fault of others may be raised by third party claim under Rule I014).
46. Rule 1-013 (G) provides that a pleading "may" state across-claim and makes no distinction between
permissive and compulsory cross-claims as Rule 1-013 does with regard to counterclaims. SCRA 1986,
R. 1-013(G). See 3 J.MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, para. 13.34111 (1987); see, e.g., Peterson

v. Watt, 666 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1982).
47. Kansas has concluded that res judicata principles do apply to bar subsequent litigation between codefendants who could have filed cross-claims in the initial action but who sought, instead, to file a separate
suit at the conclusion of the first action. Eurich v. Alkire, 224 Kan. 236, 579 P.2d 1207 (1978). Kansas
has a cross-claim rule which appears to provide that all cross-claims are permissive, see Albertson v.
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 230 Kan. 368, 373, 634 P.2d 1127, 1132 (1981). Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court of Kansas determined that "it was the intent of the legislature to fully and finally litigate
all causes of action and claims for damage arising out of any act of negligence ... in one action." Eurich,
224 Kan. at 237, 579 P.2d at 1208.
To date, the New Mexico Supreme Court has neither modified Rule 1-013(G) explicitly to provide for
compulsory cross-claims nor has it reached the same result in a judicial decision.
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of the parties, for purposes of subsequent controversies between them, are not
determined in the absence of adversity in the suit in which the original judgment
is rendered."" The court's rationale for this rule was "that the rights and duties
existing between the parties to the subsequent suit were not before the court in
49
the original suit unless such adversity was established."' New Mexico has not
yet decided whether co-defendants are adverse for purposes of collateral estoppel
when they have not pleaded cross-claims against one another, but are seeking
to assign fault to one another even as they combine forces to maximize the fault
attributable to the plaintiff and minimize the determination of damages suffered
by the plaintiff.
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments takes the position that parties, such
as co-defendants, who are not aligned as adversaries to each other "under the
pleadings in an action involving them and a third party" may still be entitled to
50
and bound by issue preclusion in subsequent litigation between themselves.
Issues necessary to the judgment which such parties "actually litigate fully and
fairly as adversaries to each other" are given issue preclusion impact despite the
absence of formal pleadings denoting the parties as adversaries."
Similarly, Kansas has concluded that collateral estoppel should apply to coseparate
defendants who could have filed cross-claims but chose, instead, to file
52
suits against one another. In Kearney v. Kansas Public Service Co. the court
held: "[I]n a comparative negligence action where codefendants actually occupy
adversary positions, they may be subsequently bound by the determination of
their respective degrees of negligence or fault even though adversarial pleadings
53
may not have been filed at the time of trial of the first action." The court noted
of making coeffect"
that the advent of several liability had the "practical
filed.'
were
cross-claims
if
no
even
adversaries
defendants
Adoption of the Restatement position by New Mexico would not inevitably
result in the application of collateral estoppel in later suits between former codefendants. The Restatement requires that there be an adversary relationship
55
between the co-defendants, in fact, before collateral estoppel could be available.
In some cases, the co-defendants might not contest their own liability, or the
comparative fault of one defendant compared to another; instead they might
48. Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Welch, 78 N.M. 494, 495, 433 P.2d 79, 80 (1967).
49. Id.
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, §38 (1980).
51. Id.
52. 233 Kan. 492, 665 P.2d 757 (1983). In Kearney, a gas explosion injured several persons and resulted
in eleven lawsuits. In each lawsuit, plaintiff joined the Kansas Public Service Company, DuPont and Dresser
Industries as defendants. In the first action to go to trial, plaintiff Kearney established that the Public Service
Company was 100% at fault and obtained ajudgment reflecting that fact. In that action, none of the three
defendants had filed cross-claims against one another. 233 Kan. at 498, 665 P.2d at 763.
After suffering the adverse verdict, the Public Service Company settled with eight other plaintiffs and
filed cross-claims against DuPont and Dresser Industries for comparative indemnity in the settled cases. In
the two remaining cases, the defendants filed no cross-claims. DuPont and Dresser Industries filed motions
for summary judgment as to the cross-claims in the settled cases and as to the potential cross-claim liability
in the two untried lawsuits where DuPont, Dresser and Public Service Company were still defendants. Id.
The supreme court ruled that the finding of the jury in the first action that Public Service Company was
100% at fault was binding in all subsequent litigation among the three defendants even though the defendants
had not filed cross-claims against one another in the first action. Id. at 510, 665 P.2d at 775.
53. Id. at 508, 665 P.2d at 773.
54. Id. at 506, 665 P.2d at 771.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, §38 (1980).
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defend only by seeking to place the entire blame on plaintiff or to litigate only
the amount of plaintiff's damages. When co-defendants put on only such a
"united front" defense, there would be no adversary relationship in
fact, and
thus no collateral estoppel under the Restatement rule.56
Even where there is an adversary relationship in fact, collateral estoppel will
apply to co-defendants only where the co-defendant against whom the doctrine
is sought to be applied "has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate. "" Normally
this will not pose a problem where the co-defendants plead and try, and the
factfinder determines, the issue of their comparative negligence. Where, in contrast, one of the co-defendants successfully moves for dismissal from the case
before the jury renders a decision, the remaining co-defendant may not have had
a full and fair opportunity to dispute the issue of the dismissed defendant's
negligence. For example, if P sues A and B, and A obtains a summary judgment
of non-liability as to P, collateral estoppel will apply to the finding that A was
not negligent only if B had a full opportunity to participate in the summary
judgment proceeding between P and A in the initial action. New Mexico has
not yet resolved the issue of the standing of one defendant to oppose a summary
judgment motion in which his co-defendant seeks to escape liability to the
plaintiff."8
Given the likelihood that collateral estoppel will apply in subsequent litigation
between co-tortfeasors, the possiblity that res judicata might also someday be
held to apply,59 and the other problems that arise when co-defendants become
adversaries in the absence of formal pleadings ,6"defendants almost always should
file cross-claims for affirmative relief against co-defendants.6
56. "lilt is generally held that a prior judgment is not conclusive in the subsequent action unless the
codefendants occupied adversary positions in the prior action and actually litigated therein the issue of their
liability inter se as well as the issue of their liability to the injured party." Gies v. Nissen Corp., 57 Wis.2d
371, 375, 204 N.W.2d 519, 523 (1973).
57. Silva, 106 N.M. at 476, 745 P.2d at 384.
58. Nor has New Mexico addressed the important related issue of the impact of a successful summary
judgment motion by one co-defendant when the remaining defendant seeks, at trial, to "lay off" fault upon
the former defendant who obtained summary judgment as against the plaintiff.
In a similar context, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has held that the remaining defendant is bound
by the result of the summary judgment determination that the co-defendant is not liable and thus cannot
assert that the winner of the summary judgment motion was partially responsible for the plaintiff's injuries.
Gies v. Nissen Corp., 57 Wis.2d 371, 377, 204 N.W.2d 519, 525 (1973). In Gies, there was a cross-claim
filed between the co-defendants at the time that one defendant obtained the summary judgment against the
plaintiff. Id. at 374-75,204 N.W.2d 521-22. The court ruled that the defendant was bound by the summary
judgment ruling exonerating his co-defendant because the defendant "cannot sit back and observe the
contest between plaintiffs and ico-defendant], upon an issue so vital to their own cause, and, in the event
Ico-defendantl succeeds, force it and the court to relitigate the issue." Id. at 377, 204 N.W.2d at 525.
Plaintiff has a stake in this issue, too. If plaintiff loses a summary judgment motion brought by defendant
A, plaintiff wants defendant B to be bound by the ruling that defendant A is faultless so that defendant B
cannot diminish B's liability at trial by insisting that defendant A was partially at fault. Plaintiff can assure
this result by cross-filing for a summary judgment dismissing defendant B's affirmative defense that defendant
A is partially at fault when defendant A seeks summary judgment against plaintiff. If the court grants
defendant A's summary judgment motion, it logically also should grant plaintiff's motion to strike B's
affirmative defense asserting the fault of defendant A.
59. See supra note 47.
60. See e.g., St. Sauver v. New Mexico Peterbilt, Inc., 101 N.M. 84,678 P.2d 712 (Ct. App. 1984)(standing
to appeal dismissal of action against co-defendant).
61. It goes without saying that defendants who were themselves injured in the accident which is the
subject of the plaintiff's suit should also file compulsory counterclaims against the plaintiff for their own
injuries. See SCRA 1986, R. 1-013(A); see also infra text accompanying notes 62-69.
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B. The Defendant Who Is Sued Alone
If the plaintiff chooses to sue only one of several tortfeasors, that defendant
must take into account the interplay of the doctrine of several liability, the doctrine
of res judicata and the new issue preclusion doctrine established in Silva in
deciding when and how to assert claims for compensation for his own injuries.
1. Counterclaims
The defendant may have a suit against the plaintiff if the defendant suffered
injuries in the same accident from which the plaintiff's suit arose. The doctrine
of res judicata requires that the defendant file a counterclaim in plaintiff's action
6
if the defendant's claim is compulsory. " A counterclaim is compulsory if it arises
out of the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff's claim against the
defendant.63 New Mexico applies the "logical relationship" test to determine if
a counterclaim is compulsory.'M Obviously, the defendant's counterclaim for
damages arising out of the same incident as the plaintiff's complaint will often
meet this test.
If the plaintiff has filed the action against only one of several tortfeasors, the
defendant who files a compulsory counterclaim must think and act like a plaintiff
in choosing whom to sue in the counterclaim. The rules of procedure permit a
65
P sued only A,
defendant to join additional parties to a counterclaim. Thus, if 66
A could join B as a co-defendant in A's counterclaim against P. As presently
construed, Rule 13 does not require that A join other tortfeasors severally 67liable
for a portion of A's harm when A files a counterclaim against the plaintiff. For
62. E.g., Heffem v. First Interstate Bank, 99 N.M. 531, 660 P.2d 621 (Ct. App. 1983).
63. SCRA 1986, R. 1-013(A). There are three exceptions. If the counterclaim requires the presence of
an indispensable party who cannot be joined, it is always permissive. Id. If the counterclaim is already
the subject of a pending action, it need not be asserted as a counterclaim, id., nor must counterclaims be
filed in actions based on in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction. Id.
64. Heffern, 99 N.M. 531, 660 P.2d 621. The court indicated the factors relevant to determination of
a "logical relationship": "The common subject matter of the claim and the counterclaim, the proximity
in time between the operative facts giving rise to each, and the cause and effect relationship between the
Id. at 534,
claim and the counterclaim all support our conclusion that a 'logical relationship' exists.
660 P.2d at 624.
65. SCRA 1986, R. 1-013(H). The rule calls for the court to order additional parties to be brought into
the suit to respond to the defendant's counterclaim when the presence of an additional party is "required
for the granting of complete relief" in the counterclaim. Id. This language might suggest that additional
parties can be joined as defendants in the counterclaim only if they are "necessary" parties under Rule I019. The construction of the rule should be more liberal. The federal rule was amended to make it clear
that the defendant may join additional parties who are "proper" but not "necessary" parties. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 13(h). Though the federal rule was modified to make explicit the availability of broad joinder in
counterclaims, the drafters of the amended federal rule explained that the amendment was designed to
make explicit a power that was implicit in the language New Mexico now has, rather than to expand the
actual scope of the rule:
Rule 13(h) Iin the form contained now in the New Mexico Rules] has also been inadequate
in failing to call attention to the fact that a party pleading a counterclaim or cross-claim
may join additional persons when the conditions for permissive joinder of parties under
Rule 20 are satisfied.
3 J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE Para. 13.01 18.-21 (1987).
66. If P sued both A and B in the original action, A would file the compulsory counterclaim against P
but would file a cross-claim against his co-defendant, B. Note that the counterclaim is compulsory, but the
cross-claim is merely permissive. See supra note 46.
67. Rule 13(H) does require that parties be joined if their presence is required "for granting of complete
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the same reasons that impel a plaintiff to join all defendants,' however, a
defendant with a compulsory counterclaim against P normally should join all
other tortfeasors as co-parties to the counterclaim. If A does not add B as a
defendant to the counterclaim, B may be able to use collateral estoppel against
A when A files a separate action against B after the close of the initial litigation.'
2. Rule 14 Impleader
a. Defendant's Incentive to Implead
If the defendant whom P sues alone was not himself injured, he will have no
counterclaim against P nor any reason to seek affirmative relief from a cotortfeasor.7" The defendant may wish, however, to reduce his own liability by
"laying off" fault on a wrongdoer not joined as a co-defendant by the plaintiff.
Under existing law, the defendant can raise this defense in two ways. The
defendant can raise the issue as an affirmative defense7 without joining the other
tortfeasor as a party.72 Defendant, instead, may file a third-party impleader action
against the omitted tortfeasor.73 Tactical reasons, not involving preclusion doctrines, might lead the defendant to use the affirmative defense in preference to
74
impleading the non-party wrongdoer.
Defendants may conclude, however, that under the new preclusion doctrine,
joinder of the tortfeasor as a third-party defendant is preferable to raising the
tortfeasor's fault only as an affirmative defense. If the unnamed tortfeasor, B,
was himself injured and has a cause of action against P and A, then A may prefer
to join B as a third-party defendant rather than to leave him out of the suit. This
is so because, under Silva, if B is not impleaded and later sues P and A in a
separate action, B may be able to use issue preclusion to bind A to findings in
the first action which are harmful to A, although A cannot use issue preclusion
to bind B to findings in the initial action that were favorable to A. 75
relief." No New Mexico court has held that severally liable tortfeasors fit this description (which is also
a definition of a party to be joined under Rule 19), though an argument for that proposition has been
advanced. See Occhialino, Procedural Ramifications of the Bartlett Decision: Tipton Tiptoes Toward a
Solution, IX NEW MEXICO TRIAL LAWYER 37 (1986).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
70. Absent joint and several liability, the defendant has no claim for contribution from a co-tortfeasor.
Wilson v. Gat, 100 N.M. 227, 668 P.2d 1104 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 100 N.M. 192, 668 P.2d 308
(1983).
71. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I(B) (Cum. Supp. 1988); SCRA 1986, R. 1-008(C); N.M. UJI CIv.
13-302(C) (Recomp. 1986).
72. See. e.g., Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 159, 646 P.2d 579, 586
(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982).
73. Tipton v. Texaco, Inc., 103 N.M. 689, 712 P.2d 1351 (1985).
74. If the defendant impleads a third-party tortfeasor, the impleaded defendant may more vigorously
deny and dispute his liability than if the tortfeasor were not named as a party to the lawsuit. In the latter
case, the defendant would have the luxury of laying off fault on an "empty chair" which does not fight
back. It is not clear, however, what incentive an impleaded third-party defendant has to deny or minimize
liability if the plaintiff seeks no affirmative relief from the third-party defendant. Such a third-party defendant
may conclude that a default in appearance is an appropriate response to the third-party complaint.
75. The discussion, supra, at text accompanying notes 22-24, demonstrating that an unjoined tortfeasor
might be able use issue preclusion against the plaintiff in the original action, is equally true of the use of
issue preclusion by the unjoined tortfeasor against the defendant in the original action.
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To illustrate:
#1 P v. A
Jury finds:
Damages-$10,000
P's fault-0%
A's fault-90%
Non-party B's Fault-10%
#2 B v. A
Issue preclusion available to A:
None
Issue preclusion available to B:
A was 90% at fault
B was only 10% at fault
P was 0% at fault
If A does not join B as a third-party defendant, therefore, B may be able to
76
use the findings from the first suit which are detrimental to A, while A will be
foreclosed from using the findings which are favorable to A. This new development, flowing from Silva, may be sufficient incentive to A to implead B in
the initial lawsuit if B also suffered injuries, even though it may be easier to
"lay off" fault on a non-party than on a third-party defendant who appears at
the trial."
b. Plaintiff's Reaction if Defendant Impleads Another Tortfeasor
When the named defendant impleads another tortfeasor upon whom to "lay
off" fault, the plaintiff must decide whether to amend his complaint to add the
third-party defendant as a direct defendant in the plaintiff's action. Where the
plaintiff did not name the impleaded tortfeasor as a defendant initially because
he was unaware that the third-party defendant was a tortfeasor, the plaintiff
normally will amend the pleading to add a claim directly against the third-party
defendant in order to recover a judgment against the newly-identified wrongdoer.7" Where, however, P consciously omitted B as a defendant in the original
76. There is one important qualification. B's use of issue preclusion in this hypothetical is an example
of the affirmative use of issue preclusion by a non-party to the first action. See Silva, 106 N.M. at 475,
745 P.2d at 383. The Supreme Court of New Mexico noted, with apparent approval, that the United States
Supreme Court has concluded that the use of offensive collateral estoppel is acceptable if otherwise fair
"except in cases where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action." Id. (citing Parklane
Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979)).
If B is aware of the pendency of the suit between P and A, A might argue that B's failure to intervene
(as a co-plaintiff with P against A, while filing a cross-claim against P at the same time), see SCRA 1986,
R. 1-024, constitutes a justification for barring B from using affirmative non-mutual collateral estoppel
against A.
77. Once joined as a third-party defendant, B must file a compulsory counterclaim against the thirdparty plaintiff, A, and "may" file a claim for affirmative relief against the original plaintiff. SCRA 1986,
R. 1-014(A).
78. If the statute of limitations has run on P's claim against B by the time that P seeks to amend his
complaint to add a claim against the impleaded B, plaintiff may not be able to add B as a defendant unless
P satisfies the rule concerning the relation back of amendments which add new parties. See SCRA, 1986
R. 1-015(C); Romero v. Ole Tires, Inc., 101 N.M. 759, 688 P.2d 1263 (Ct. App. 1984). In Duffy v.
Horton Memorial Hosp., 66 N.Y.2d 473, 488 N.E.2d 820, 497 N.Y.S.2d 890 (1985), the New York Court
of Appeals ruled that so long as A impleaded B prior to the running of the statute of limitations on P's
potential claim against B, P could amend his pleading to add a claim against B even though the limitations
period had run at the time that P sought to add B as a defendant.
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action for tactical reasons, P must reassess those tactics in light of the preclusion
possibilities created by Silva.
Rule 14 provides that plaintiff "may" file any claim P has against the thirdparty defendant arising out of the same transaction as plaintiff's claim against
the original defendant.' The rule is permissive, not mandatory; if plaintiff chooses
not to assert a claim against the third-party defendant, plaintiff's subsequent
separate action against the third-party defendant will not be subject to the defense
of res judicata.5 0
It is less clear whether plaintiff's failure to make a claim against the thirdparty defendant will have issue preclusion ramifications should plaintiff later
decide to file a separate action directly against the third-party defendant. 8
To illustrate:
#1 P v. A
A v. B (Rule 14 impleader)
Findings:
P's damages-$ 10,000
P's fault-20%
A's fault-10%
B's fault-70%
#2 P v. B
Issue preclusion available to P:
P's damages-$10,000
B's fault-70%
Issue preclusion available to B:
P's damages-$ 10,000
P's fault-20%
P and B were both parties to the first lawsuit. Thus, even the traditional
mutuality requirement"2 for collateral estoppel is met. Application of collateral
estoppel against either P or B would likewise satisfy the "against whom" portion
of the new test adopted in Silva.83 More problematic is whether the "full and
fair opportunity to litigate" portion of the Silva test' is met when P seeks to
79. SCRA 1986, R. 1-014(A).
80. "It should be noted that Rule 14(a) states that plaintiff 'may assert' his claims against the
thirdparty defendant, indicating that plaintiff is not required to bring them forward but is free to assert
them in
a later action." C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1459, at 314 (1971).
See
Williams v. Miller, 58 N.M. 472, 272 P.2d 676 (1954)(Plaintiff may file separate suit against impleaded
third-party defendant; note, however, that in this case there was no subject matter jurisdiction in the
initial
action over a claim by plaintiff against the third-party defendant.).
81. B's decision whether to seek affirmative relief from A or P is influenced by the language of
Rule
14. Once A impleads B, B "may" assert against the plaintiff any claim B has against plaintiff "arising
out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party
plaintiff." SCRA 1986, R. 1-014(A). In the federal courts, "Itihe provision is permissive," rather
than
mandatory. 3 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, para. 14.16121.
Note, however, that B "shall" file counterclaims against A "as provided in rule 13." SCRA 1986,
R.
1-014(A). Thus, B must seek affirmative relief fromA but has the option to seek relief from P by counterclaim
or by filing a separate action against P. There is no obvious reason why B would decline to counterclaim
against P when compelled to counterclaim for affirmative relief from A.
82. See, e.g., Edwards v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Clovis, 102 N.M. 396, 696 P.2d 484
(Ct.
App. 1985).
83. Silva v. State, 102 N.M. 472, 745 P.2d 380 (1987).
84. Id. at 474, 745 P.2d at 382. ("Fundamental fairness requires that the party against whom estoppel
is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.").
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use preclusion against B. A critical issue in determining fairness is 85
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first
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not
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vigorously.
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any amount, B has no financial stake in the outcome of the litigation into which
and whatever86
B is impleaded. Whatever the damages assessed by the factfinder,
liable to pay any amount.
be
not
will
B
B,
to
attributed
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of
the percentage
Only by a circular process of reasoning can the application of issue preclusion
against B in the second action be justified. If the court were to announce that B
will be subject to collateral estoppel whenever A impleads B, B would then have
the requisite incentive to defend vigorously in the impleader action. Until the
courts put B on notice of the applicability of collateral estoppel, though, B will
lack the incentive to litigate, which is a prerequisite to the application of issue
preclusion.
A second reason exists for barring P from applying collateral estoppel against7
against B.
B in a subsequent suit. P seeks to use collateral estoppel offensively
8
supreme
the
estoppel,
While Silva authorizes the use of offensive collateral
offensive
when
doctrine
the
apply
to
decline
may
court suggested that a court
collateral estoppel is sought in the89second case by "a plaintiff [who] could easily
have joined in the earlier action." Once B is identified as a possible tortfeasor
and made a third-party defendant by the defendant, P can amend the complaint
pleading to add B as a defendant in plaintiff's action." Plaintiff's failure to
amend the pleading to add a claim against B should be analogized to the failure
of a person who voluntarily chooses not to join as a party in earlier litigation;
plaintiff should not be allowed to use offensive collateral estoppel in that situation. 9
85. Id. at 475, 745 P.2d at 383.
than default in
86. Indeed, precisely for this reason, it is difficult to understand why B would do other
defense by B
most cases in which B is impleaded pursuant to Tipton. What is the purpose of a vigorous
if no one is seeking affirmative relief from B?
87. "lOlffensive use of collateral estoppel loccurs when] a plaintiff is seeking to estop a defendant from
Parklane
relitigating the issues which the defendant previously litigated and lost against another plaintiff."
Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329 (1979).
88. Silva, 106 N.M. at 476, 745 P.2d at 384.
89. Silva, 106 N.M. at 475, 745 P.2d at 383. The court noted that the Supreme Court of the United
States also expressed a wariness of permitting offensive collateral estoppel by one who could have become
a party to the earlier suit and chose not to do so. Id.
could
In Parklane Hosiery the Court declared: "The general rule should be that in cases where a plaintiff
easily have joined in the earlier action . . . a trial judge should not allow the use of offensive collateral
estoppel." 439 U.S. at 331.
90. "The plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party defendant arising out of the transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff." SCRA
1986, R. 1-014(A).
91. See Silva, 106 N.M. at 475, 745 P.2d at 383. In tum, if the third-party defendant was himself
injured, he "shall" file his claim for relief as a compulsory counterclaim against the defendant, SCRA
1986, R. 1-014(A), and "may" also assert his claim for affirmative relief against the plaintiff. Id. Thus,
B's failure to file the counterclaim against the defendant, A, will result in res judicata preclusion if the
v.
third-party defendant later seeks to file a separate action for relief against the defendant. See Heffem
First Interstate Bank, 99 N.M. 531, 660 P.2d 621 (Ct. App. 1983).
In contrast, the filing of a claim by the third-party defendant B against plaintiff is optional, SCRA 1986,
R. 1-014(A), and will not result in a res judicata bar should B, the third-party defendant, later sue the
original plaintiff for damages suffered in the accident by B. If the separate suit is filed, however, the former

Winter 1988]

IMPACT OF NON-MUTUAL COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

575

If, in contrast, the impleaded B seeks to apply defensive collateral estoppel
in the later action brought by P against B, the court might well conclude that B
should be allowed to do so. First, defensive collateral estoppel is less likely than
offensive collateral estoppel to foster inefficiency.92 Moveover, P,unlike B, had
a strong incentive in the first lawsuit against A to maximize damages, minimize
his own fault and minimize the percentage of fault attributable to himself and
to B. Only by so doing could plaintiff maximize his recovery in the first action.
Because P had an incentive and a full and fair opportunity to litigate these issues
in the first action, P should be bound by the findings in the first action if, when
later suing B, P is confronted with B's defensive use of collateral estoppel. In
turn, P's exposure to defensive collateral estoppel and his likely inability to use
estoppel against B should promote a strong incentive to P in the initial lawsuit
to amend his complaint to seek relief from B when A impleads B pursuant to
Tipton.

V. THE POTENTIAL PLAINTIFF'S PERSPECTIVE
At first glance, the greatest beneficiary of Silva is neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant in the first suit. The injured future plaintiff who is a bystander to the
first action but who plans to file a later action against the same defendants appears
to gain the most from the application of the new collateral estoppel rules.
This future plaintiff can await the results of the first trial and then decide
whether to use the findings there as the basis for issue preclusion in his later
suit. If the results of the first case are favorable to the initial plaintiff, he will
assert issue preclusion. If the results are not favorable, the plaintiff in the second
action will forego issue preclusion and will litigate de novo the issues resolved
favorably to the defendants in the first suit. As a result, "the plaintiff has every
incentive to adopt a 'wait and see' attitude, in the hope that the first action by
another plaintiff will result in a favorable judgment.""
This potential for abuse of estoppel when used offensively by a plaintiff who
was not a party in the first action has not gone unnoticed or unremedied. In
ParklaneHosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that offensive collateral estoppel "does not promote judicial economy in
the same manner as defensive use does."94
In a different but related context, the New Mexico Supreme Court has exhibited
third-party defendant should not be allowed to use issue preclusion against the original plaintiff because
the failure to exercise the option of filing a claim against plaintiff in the original action is analogous to the
failure to intervene in an initial lawsuit when one has the option to do so. See supra note 89. Permitting
offensive collateral estoppel in such circumstances would create an incentive for B not to assert his claim
against P in the original action. The court can only foster efficiency and fairness by refusing to permit B
to use collateral estoppel, thus removing this incentive to forego the filing of available claims in the initial

action.
92.

lOlffensive use of collateral estoppel does not promote judicial economy in the same
manner as defensive use does .... IDlefensive collateral estoppel gives a plaintiff a
strong incentive to join all potential defendants in the first action if possible. Offensive
use of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, creates precisely the opposite incentive.
Parldane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-30 (1979).
93. Id. at 329-30.
94. 439 U.S. at 329.
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a similar dislike of future plaintiffs who wait to see which way the wind blows
in the first trial. In Valley Utilities, Inc. v. O'Hare,95 five persons joined as
plaintiffs to sue a defendant who had caused harm to a large number of individuals. The plaintiffs styled their action as a class action, but under the thenexisting law,' only class members who intervened in the action were bound by
the decision. After the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the named plaintiffs,
as many as 203 persons were permitted to intervene in order to benefit from the
verdict. 97 The supreme court reversed. The court was critical of post-trial intervention for the same reason that the use of offensive collateral estoppel is disfavored: "Otherwise other members of the class might have remained on the
sidelines while the parties litigated the issues, with no risk of being bound by
an unfavorable decision, and then have come in to take advantage of a favorable
ruling." 98 Analogizing the class members to nonparties who could have intervened under Rule 24, 9 the court refused to authorize post-trial intervention in
the absence of extraordinary circumstances. " In effect, the court ruled that
persons who could have intervened in the initial action but chose to stand by
and wait until the result of the trial was known should not be allowed to use the
result of the trial to foreclose litigation concerning the defendant's liability.
In Parklane Hosiery, the United States Supreme Court reached a similar
conclusion limiting the use of offensive collateral estoppel by a person who could
have intervened in the first suit but who chose, instead, to sit on the sidelines.
In addition to barring issue preclusion where it would be unfair generally to
allow it,"0 "[t]he general rule should be that in cases where a plaintiff could
easily have joined in the earlier action,2 . . . a trial judge should not allow the
use of offensive collateral estoppel." o
Thus, the federal doctrine generally bars a future plaintiff from taking advantage of offensive collateral estoppel where that person made a conscious choice
to stand by and await the outcome of the initial lawsuit. ' The logic of the Valley
Utilities"°s opinion suggests that New Mexico will do the same.
95. 89 N.M. 262, 550 P.2d 274 (1976).
96. N.M. STAT. ANN. §21-1-1(23) (1953) (now superseded).
97. "The trial court deferred judgment as to the 203 (other class members], ordering instead that notice
be sent to them informing them of the favorable jury verdict, and inviting them to intervene within sixty
days if they wished to share in a final judgment .... " 89 N.M. at 263, 550 P.2d at 275.
98. Id. at 264, 550 P.2d at 276 (quoting with approval from 3B J. MOORE, J. KENNEDY, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE §23.12 at 2917 (2d ed. 1975)).
99. Id.; see SCRA 1986, R. 1-024.
100. 89 N.M. at 264, 550 P.2d at 276.
101. See supra note 24.
102. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS §29(3) (1980) (court may decline to allow issue preclusion if "'tlhe person seeking to invoke
favorable preclusion, or to avoid unfavorable preclusion, could have effected joinder in the first action
between himself and his present adversary.").
103. Defendants should, perhaps, send notices of the pendency of the initial action to likely future
plaintiffs and should suggest the possibility of permissive intervention, see SCRA 1986, R. 1-024, in order
to create a record for the application of the general rule barring issue preclusion to those who adopt a "wait
and see" approach.
104. 89 N.M. 262, 550 P.2d 274 (1976).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Silva expands the use of collateral estoppel in litigation involving several
liability by permitting a non-party to the first action to use the doctrine against
a party to the first lawsuit. This, in turn, should encourage persons who are
parties to the first lawsuit to use every procedural device available to assure that
all persons injured and all persons potentially liable for the harms done in an
accident will be parties to the first suit. Denying the use of issue preclusion by
non-parties to the intital action who could have become parties will discourage
potential future plaintiffs from purposely staying out of the initial action and
may act as an incentive for them to become parties.
The net effect of Silva, then, is to foster the goal that a single lawsuit should
determine all rights and liabilities arising from the same transaction. This centripetal force toward a single lawsuit serves not only the tactical goals of the
parties, but also the jurisprudential goals of judicial efficiency and consistency
of results. For better or worse, the combination of the doctrine of several liability
and the adoption of non-mutual collateral estoppel will lead to fewer but more
complex lawsuits in tort actions.

